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Abstract: Over last 10-years period there has been just one helicopter accident (with no fatalities) in 
the Norwegian sector of helicopter offshore operations. In this case, safety monitoring cannot be based 
on the absence of accidents. The main objective of this paper is to suggest a combination of leading 
and lagging indicators to monitor safety performance for helicopter offshore operations. An approach 
is described to identify indicators using different perspectives: a Risk Influence Model, the Functional 
Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM), and lessons learned from previous studies. The approach uses 
accident and incident data, as well as normal operations (when nothing goes wrong). The suggested 
indicators were evaluated through observations and interviews/workshop with helicopter operators, air 
traffic controllers, helicopter deck operators and regulators. The paper discusses the approach and 
proposes a set of domain specific safety performance indicators. The work was carried out under the 
Norwegian Helicopter Safety Study 3 (HSS-3).  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Background 
 
Measurements of safety performance in aviation traditionally rely on lagging indicators such as 
accident rates, which may be further decomposed to identify particular safety issues. This 
categorization of accidents has enabled several improvements on specific issues. However, there is a 
growing concern that this information does not provide the required basis for the prevention of future 
accidents. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) recommended the establishment of 
an effective Safety Management System (SMS) [1]. Indicators are therefore needed to provide an 
adequate understanding of the current state of the system, and to predict possible future events or 
consequences of changes; i.e., leading rather than lagging indicators. Yet despite the benefit of a 
proactive SMS, the aviation industry generally still focuses on the reactive part of safety management.  
 
Helicopter transport is essential for petroleum activities in the North Sea, since there is no other 
effective way to transport personnel. Over the last 10-years period there has been just one helicopter 
accident (with no fatalities) in the Norwegian sector of helicopter offshore operations. In this case, 
monitoring of safety cannot be based on the absence of accidents. This paper presents the results of 
work carried out under the Helicopter Safety Study -3 (HSS-3) [2], which had the overall objectives to 
contribute to improve safety and to set a reference standard for methodologies to analyse risk of 
offshore helicopter transportation. The HSS-3 project was a follow-up of previous studies: HSS-1 
(period 1966-1990) [3] and HSS-2 (period 1990-1998) [4]. For the development of indicators, an 
important mandate for HSS-3 is to use experience from previous helicopter studies [3, 4, 5]. To 
complement this approach, HSS-3 incorporates development within safety thinking using a resilience 
engineering perspective to identify safety indicators. 
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1.2. Purpose of the paper 
 
The main objective of this paper is to suggest a combination of leading and lagging indicators to 
monitor safety performance for helicopter offshore operations. An approach is described that identifies 
indicators, using different perspectives: (1) the Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM), (2) a 
Risk Influence Model, and (3) lessons learned from previous studies. Data from normal operations 
(when nothing goes wrong), were used together with accident and incident data. The paper discusses 
the approach and proposes a set of domain specific safety performance indicators.  
 
1.3. Delimitations 
 
The main focus is the indicators within aviation safety in relation to major accidents, hence excludes 
occupational accidents. The FRAM method was used for the identification of indicators in relation to a 
specific scenario landing on helicopter deck. Several publications have described the use of risk 
influence models [2, 3, 4]. The paper emphasized indicators identified through monitoring normal 
operations.  
  
 
2. APPROACH 
 
2.1. Combining perspectives to identify indicators 
 
Different perspectives were used to identify safety indicators as illustrated in Figure 1. The literature 
survey enabled a theoretical understanding of safety indicators, identification of relevant criteria and 
indicators from other studies. Resilience Engineering represents an alternative perspective on safety 
that takes into account successes and failures [6]. Resilience is defined as the intrinsic ability of a 
system to adjust its functioning prior to, during, or following changes and disturbances, so that it can 
sustain required operations under both expected and unexpected conditions. Resilience Engineering 
aims to develop theories, tools and methods to support resilient organizations. The FRAM method is 
based on resilience engineering principles and was used to identify leading indicators. The HSS-3 RIF 
model is an update of previous HSS-2 model. The RIF model was explored to identify lagging 
indicators. In combination with a literature survey, this provided candidates for indicators that were 
assessed in close consultation with the industry using indicators criteria, leading to a final set of 
leading and lagging indicators. 
 
2.2. Data gathering 
 
The identification of indicators was based on an iterative process: 
 An initial set of indicators was identified based on literature review, application of RIF and 
FRAM method. 
 A workshop assessed indicators against indicator criteria. 
 Interviews with operational staff (pilots, engineers, training, helicopter deck, air traffic 
controllers, petroleum representatives and regulator) assessed indicators against indicator 
criteria. 
 Observations of helicopter landing on helicopter deck during simulator session helped to 
improve modeling and improved analyst understanding of the context of operations. 
 
2.3. Important lessons from literature survey 
 
Baseline for HSS-3 was the recommendations in the public report “Helicopter Safety on the on the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf, Part 2: Trends, objectives, risk influencing factors and recommended 
measures” [5]. The indicators that can be used to monitor risk were:   
 number of deaths per million flight hours;  
 number of accidents per million flight hours;  
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 number of deaths per year due to helicopter transport;  
 number of serious accidents and incidents per year or million flight hours;  
 number of occurrences per year or million flight hours,  
 number of technical and operational reports per year or per million flight hours; and  
 subjective risk (questionnaire) 
 
Figure 1: HSS-3 overall approach to propose lagging and leading indicators 
 
 
 
 
Over the last 10-years period there has been just one helicopter accident (with no fatalities) in the 
Norwegian sector. In addition, changes in regulations contribute to a reclassification of incidents and 
an increased of number of reports. An increased number of reports do not necessarily provide an 
indication of poor safety performance. Fatality rate and increased number of reports are therefore not 
suitable as sole indicators for safety performance. To complement this view, it is necessary to look for 
accident precursors to assess safety performance. In general, leading indicators are defined as 
conditions, events or measures that can be used to predict the future occurrence of an event, e.g., as 
accident precursors. The literature shows that there is no consistency between the definition of 
indicators and their application [9]. Special attention should therefore be given to the definition of 
indicators each time they are addressed.  
 
Based on literature review, discussion in international forums and author’s experience the following 
definitions are used: 
 
 Lagging indicators measure results after unwanted events.  
 Leading indicators refer to current system status and their interpretation may be used to say 
something about future performance  
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The literature presents an extensive list of characteristics for indicators. There is a need for a realistic 
approach for the selection. The following characteristics are adopted: 
 
 Meaningful: the value can be correlated to accident frequency or consequence, a RIF for the 
risk model on accidents, or with FRAM functions for the risk model for normal operations. 
 Available or affordable: it is possible to gather data with a reasonable cost. 
 Reliable: The data should as far as possible be either objective or intersubjectively verifiable. 
 Operational: It is possible to use the indicator to identify specific improvement measures in an 
operational context. 
 Ownership: The indicators are “owned” by the personnel which performance is measured. 
 
The Accident Investigation Board/Norway (AIBN) presents a study regarding the relation between 
concurrent organizational changes and safety [11]. In this study 5 outcome-based and 38 activity-
based performance indicators for flight safety were proposed [11, 12]. The development of indicators 
and determination of importance for flight safety are based on safety audit checklists and discussions 
with experienced people from the Norwegian and Swedish civil aviation authorities. These indicators 
are considered as candidates for HSS-3 recommended indicators. Another significant finding in the 
study showed is that there is a strong focus on learning from rare accidents and failures. There is no 
tradition to analyze successes (normal operations with no delays) [13]. This trend has changed for 
flight operations and air traffic management with the introduction of Line Operations Safety Audit 
(LOSA) and Normal Operations Safety Survey (NOSS) respectively. These safety management tools 
are mainly based on managing errors and threats. 
 
2.4. Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) 
 
Resilience Engineering provides a practical basis for the development of systemic models in order to 
describe the characteristic performance of a system as a whole. It can therefore also be used as the 
starting point for developing a systemic or functional risk model (FRM). The purpose of a systemic 
model is to describe the dynamic and non-linear nature of what happens within a system. This should 
be seen as a complement to the traditional view where accidents are described either as sequences or 
as concatenation of latent conditions. Hollnagel presents a new method to perform accident 
investigation and safety assessment, called the Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) [7].  
 
Resilience engineering sees success is as a consequence of the ability of groups, individuals, and 
organizations to anticipate the changing shape of risk before damage occurs; failure is simply the 
temporary or permanent absence of that. Adopting this view means that there is a need for models that 
can represent the variability of normal performance and methods that can use this both to provide 
more comprehensive explanations of accidents and to identify the possible risks. The helicopter safety 
study adopts this view to identify leading indicators. 
 
In its present form, FRAM comprises the following five steps [8]: 
 
Define the purpose of the analysis, since FRAM can be used for both accident investigation and safety 
assessment. 
 
Identify and describe system functions. The result of the second step is the model. Every function can 
be characterized by six basic aspects: Input (I, that which the function uses or transforms), Output (O, 
that which the function produces), Preconditions (P, conditions that must be fulfilled to perform a 
function), resources (R, that which the function needs or consumes), Time (T, that which affects time 
availability), and Control (C, that which supervises or adjusts the function). A FRAM function is 
shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: The six aspects of a FRAM function 
 
 
 
 
Assess and evaluate the potential variability of each function. This evaluation should be integrated 
with the retrospective information extracted from accident databases to the extent that data are 
available.  
 
Identify functional resonance by means of instantiations. An instantiation illustrates aspects and the 
potential links among the functions in a defined context [10]. Figure 3 shows an instantiation for 
approach planning. The aim of this step is to determine the possible ways in which the variability from 
one function could spread in the system and how it may combine with the variability of other 
functions. This may result in situations where the system loses its capability safely to manage 
variability. The propagation may be both indirect via the effects that the variability may have on the 
general conditions or direct via the output from a function.  
 
Identify effective countermeasures or barriers that can be introduced in the system. In FRAM, 
prospective countermeasures aim at dampening performance variability in order to maintain the 
system in a safe state. But it is consistent with the principle of Resilience Engineering to consider also 
measures that can sustain or amplify functional resonance that leads to desired or improved outcomes. 
Besides recommendations for countermeasures or barriers, FRAM can also be used to specify 
recommendations for the monitoring of performance and variability, in order to be able to detect 
undesired variability at an early stage. Performance indicators may thus be developed for individual 
functions and for the couplings among functions.  
 
Figure 3: Instantiation landing on helicopter deck – flight planning (1 hour before departure) 
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2.5. Risk Influence Modeling (RIF) 
 
The risk influence model in the HSS-3 project is an update of the model developed in the previous 
helicopter safety study [4]. This approach assumes that accidents and incidents can be described as the 
result of cause-effect relations, sometimes as a single cause-effect chain but more often as a 
combination of multiple cause-effect chains.  
 
The risk influence model is based on a number of Risk Influencing Factors (RIFs) arranged in 
influence diagrams. A RIF is defined as a set of conditions that influence the risk, either positively or 
negatively. The RIFs are likely to have a varying degree of importance for the different categories of 
accidents. Eight different accident categories are defined in the model. These categories are: accident 
by take-off or landing on heliport, accident by take-off or landing on helicopter deck, accident 
following critical aircraft system failure during flight, near miss or mid-air collision with other aircraft, 
collision with terrain, sea or building structure, accident exposing passengers inside the helicopter, 
accident exposing passengers outside the helicopter and other/unknown (i.e. lightening). The status of 
a RIF may be improved by specific actions or become worse due to changes and threats.  
 
The RIFs are split into two categories; risk frequency influencing factors (as shown in Figure 4) and 
risk consequence influencing factors, and are organized in three levels. Operational RIFs (Level 1) are 
risk influencing factors related to activities directly influencing the risk and that are necessary to 
provide safe helicopter operations on a day-to-day basis. These activities include conditions related to 
technical dependability, operational dependability, provision of necessary external services and 
surroundings. Organisational RIFs (Level 2) are defined as risk influencing factors related to the 
organizational basis, support and control of running activities in the helicopter transport. These factors 
are related to helicopter manufacturers or design organizations, helicopter operators, maintenance 
organizations, air traffic and navigation services, heliport and helicopter deck operators. Regulatory 
and customer related RIFs (Level 3) are defined as risk influencing factors related to requirements and 
controlling activities from international organizations, authorities and customers. 
 
Figure 4: Risk Influence Model HSS-3 for the frequency of accidents  
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3. MAIN RESULTS 
 
3.1. Leading indicators identified applying FRAM 
 
The scenario described in this paper is an approach to and landing on a floating platform during night 
with good visibility and no unusual events. Results from the application of FRAM referred to the five 
steps described in section 2.2. In the first step FRAM was used as safety assessment looking into 
normal operations to identify relevant indicators. In the second step a corpus of 21 functions was 
identified as relevant for the scenario landing on helicopter deck, e.g., Table 1.  
 
 
Table 1: Example of FRAM functions for scenario landing on helicopter deck 
Landing on helicopter deck FRAM functions 
Manage contracts Manage competence 
Perform weight & balance calculations Manage procedures 
Approach planning Fix approach on GPS 
Do pre-landing preparations Arrive to minimum descend 
Approach near by obstruction  Establish visual 
Decide approach type (see Table 2) Verify position 
Land  Support helicopter landing  
 
Each function was characterized in terms of six aspects (an example is shown on table 2). The 
granularity of the description of functions was based on iterative assessment of the scenario and the 
functions between the analyst and pilot. 
 
Table 2: FRAM function characterization 
FRAM Function Decide Approach type 
Input Helicopter deck personnel on helicopter deck 
Input Helicopter deck obstacles report 
Input Cockpit display information: wind and position 
Output Decision 
Precondition Helicopter airworthy 
Precondition Company message “ Over deck & over circle” 
Time Visual 
Control Approach procedures 
 
The third step was the assessment of the potential variability for each singular function. Landing on 
helicopter deck was analyzed in relation to landing on fixed and floating oil and gas installation during 
day and night. In this way, it was possible to determine variability related to normal operations. The 
fourth step is the determination of the ways in which variability is spread through the system. 
Instantiations were used to illustrate the combinations of variability. Then indicators were determined 
based on significant combinations of variability (bold letters illustrated on Figure 5).  
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Figure 5: FRAM instantiation for landing on helicopter deck during night 
 
 
 
 
It was necessary to have operational indicators (shown in Table 3). This was achieved through 
discussions with operational and management personnel.  
 
Table 3: Example of indicators identified for normal operations  
Indicator Operationalization 
Helicopter airworthy Indicators related to maintenance performance, Vibration Health 
Monitoring and Minimum Equipment List 
Quality of communication helicopter 
crew and helicopter deck personnel 
There are individual differences in relation to installation type i.e. fixed 
or floating. Use of observations to provide a qualitative evaluation.  
Procedures quality and compliance Use of audits and/or observations to provide an assessment of procedures 
revision and compliance 
Manage contracts – use of penalties Number of free days that have been negotiated, use of overtime 
Visual references  Helicopter deck status in relation to regulation and recognized guidelines 
 
3.2. Lagging indicators identified using RIF approach 
 
The indicators are based on number of incidents and are mainly related to the operational level. 
Examples of identified indicators are: 
 Technical RIF: Windshield cracking, chip warning, oil leakage detected by walk-around 
 Operational RIF: Overload of cargo, incorrect marking or improper handling of dangerous 
goods, fuelling event, wrong charts in flight folder 
 Helicopter deck RIF: Crane or other obstacles on rig near to helicopter deck, incorrect 
helicopter deck position, incorrect information of pitch/roll/heave from moving helicopter 
decks 
 Weather and other RIF: Incorrect weather information, bird strikes 
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4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Helicopter safety is a result of something that the system does and not a passive property of the 
system. Safety is a dynamic characteristic and the result of interaction between several organizations. 
This view guides the indicators that are identified in the study. Each method represents different ways 
of understanding, it is necessary to be aware of their advantages and limitations. The paper 
demonstrates how a combination of several approaches provides a set of lagging and leading 
indicators. Since we are addressing a dynamic characteristic, it is recommended periodically to review 
the indicators to see if they are still relevant or whether new indicators should be considered.  
 
The literature review show that the majority of indicators are selected from check lists or because they 
are easy to collect. This approach does not necessarily support indicators relevance towards safety. 
The FRAM modeling provides a more dynamic approach to helicopter operations. The use of 
instantiations enables to illustrate how variability spreads and which variability is significant to a 
successful landing. The main advantage of FRAM is that this approach considers the influence of the 
context on actual performance. Indicators identified using FRAM are leading, these indicators show a 
correlation to a successful operation. Indicators identified using RIF model are mainly lagging, these 
indicators are based on incidents and accidents information. The RIF model provides an static picture 
of the overall helicopter offshore operations. The recommended set of indicators represents a 
combination of quantitative and qualitative data. Experience from previous studied show that 
quantitative information does not provide enough information towards the quality aspect. This 
shortcoming is compensated emphasizing the importance of observations and use qualitative data. 
 
This study represents a step forward from mainly learning from failures to consider also normal 
operations without failures. This approach has helped to identify alternative indicators. The 
identification of indicators using FRAM and the modeling enhanced understanding of the system. The 
indicator discussions with the industry helped to identify recommended measures to improve safety 
relevant to actual performance. The RIF approach allows a perspective of helicopter performance 
during the last 30 years. The FRAM approach represents a step forward in using new methods to 
improve aviation safety. While RIF method is widely recognized for risk assessment. The FRAM 
approach will require more applications to demonstrate its capability and have wider acceptance 
within the safety community.  
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